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Abstract
This paper attempts to determine the unseen consequences of lowering labor market flexibility and its impact
on individuals’ demand for higher education by using standard OLS multiple regression analysis and cross-
sectional data. I examine the independent variables that are theorized to increase the percentage of college
diplomas attained in the market. Independent variables are chosen based on what has been studied in the
prior literature. This study finds that labor market flexibility has a positive correlation with the percentage of
adult population who have a higher education diploma. The results of this study suggest that individuals’
demand for higher education is a multifaceted issue that is not close to being fully explained.
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Introduction 
  Many developed countries presently have the tendency of implementing 
policies that harm labor market flexibility in the name of protecting workers from 
market verdicts. Policies such as raising the minimum wage, requiring mandatory 
severance pay, restrictions on hiring additional workers, and implementing firing 
restriction are some examples. These policies are put into place with the intention 
of increasing job security and the welfare of employees. However, policy makers 
fail to consider the unintended consequences of government intervention in the 
labor market, which alters incentives to both employers and employees. This 
harms the labor market process and ultimately harms employees. Even though 
their intentions may be noble, the end result likely differs from the initial intended 
purpose. The benefits of such public policies are easily noticed and are used as a 
reason to enforce the policy, but the costs of the policy are hidden and ignored. 
This logic of seen and unseen consequences of government action is well 
explained by Frederic Bastiat’s infamous parable of “The Broken Window”. 
Bastiat (1850) states that if a baker with a broken window paid a glazier to fix the 
window instead of buying shoes, this would artificially increase the income of the 
glazier. However, this ignores the cost borne to the shoemaker and all the other 
future beneficiaries of his transactions from the chain reaction of the market. 
Government intervention in the labor market in the form of reducing the labor 
market flexibility is not exempt from the law of unintended consequences. 
Therefore, the artificially raised job security and employee welfare comes with a 
cost that is borne by the public in the form of less investment in human capital.  
 Many researchers have studied the unseen effect of low labor market 
flexibility in terms of employment rate. However, the impact of low labor market 
flexibility on education is a relatively unexplored line of research. Our 
understanding about this issue is limited and uncertain, even though the 
discussion of whether to increase worker protection or not is becoming 
increasingly politically charged. Thus, the purpose of this study is to explore the 
unintended consequences in the higher education market resulting from low labor 
market flexibility.  
 
Thesis Statement   
 The link between the effect of labor market flexibility and education in the 
labor market is signaling. If low labor market flexibility forces businesses to be 
more selective in the hiring process in response to the rise in firing costs, then 
individual job seekers’ competition in gaining competitive signals, information 
regarding the value of their labor services, will become more intense. 
Additionally, because employers will wish to avoid unnecessary firing costs when 
workers do not perform as expected, they will prefer workers who offer more 
certainty in future job performance. This preference will sharpen the screening 
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 process as well as making it more rigorous. The signal and the level of certainty in 
the screening process, in this case, are determined by one’s educational 
attainment. Based on this chain of reasoning, I have constructed a hypothesis that 
low labor market flexibility artificially raises individuals’ demand for higher 
education in order to obtain a signal that overcomes higher screening rigor.  
 Based on this idea, I suggest theoretical evidence to support the hypothesis 
and empirically test it to verify the correlation between labor market flexibility 
and demand for higher education. If the hypothesis is correct, then a negative 
relationship between labor freedom and the proportion of higher education 
diplomas produced is expected.        
 
 
Literature Review 
 Labor market flexibility is defined as, “the ability of businesses to contract 
freely for labor and dismiss redundant workers when they are no longer needed, 
[which] is a vital mechanism for enhancing productivity and sustaining overall 
economic growth” (Heritage Foundation). This labor market flexibility is 
determined by a government’s labor market policies. Flexible labor markets have 
the characteristics of higher employment rates and higher participation rate in the 
labor force (Tella&MacCulloch, 2003). Also, flexible labor markets allow 
individuals to earn commensurate wages for the skills that they have. Since 
individual skills vary, wage inequality tends to increase in a flexible labor market 
(Kahn, 2012). 
 Labor market policies are implemented to create employee protection for 
permanent jobs, and many researchers have found empirical evidence that low 
labor market flexibility leads to higher incidences of long-term unemployment 
(Booth et al. 2002; Nickell&Layard, 1999). The number of long-term jobs 
decreases in the labor market if job security rises as a result of employers 
becoming more reluctant to hire due to the rising cost of firing employees. This 
impacts the job market by creating a higher rate of temporary employment (Kahn, 
2007). Therefore, the market inflexibility eventually results in the substitution of 
temporary for permanent employment (Kahn, 2010). Then the question is, what 
factors directly influence businesses to alter their behaviors so as to cause job 
substitution? 
 Lowering labor market flexibility increases job security, which eventually 
raises the cost of firing employees. Businesses are organizations that maximize 
profit by reducing the risk of uncertainty of their investment. Bettis and Mahajan 
(1985) show empirical evidence that a trade-off exists between risk and 
profitability when firms evaluate an investment. This trade-off in investments 
applies to the hiring process as well. According to Spence (1973), hiring is a risk-
taking investment that carries the uncertainty of one’s productivity. In other 
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 words, if a projected return on hiring is high, an employer is more likely to bear 
higher uncertainty than if the projected return to the hiring is low. But, if the cost 
of uncertainty increases, the demand for hiring decreases, and the employer tries 
to eliminate the uncertainty as much as possible. Therefore, raising the firing cost 
by public policy makes businesses more concerned and cautious about the 
possibility of making a wrong investment. Thus, businesses naturally move 
toward hiring temporary employment instead of permanent employment because 
of its relatively low opportunity cost. Also, the high cost of uncertainty for long-
term employment that is caused by low labor market flexibility makes employers 
become more selective in the hiring process. This is often referred to as 
“screening”.  
 Screening is an identification of a laborer’s quality; it enables individuals 
to receive proper responses to their signals, and it also eases the matching 
problem in the market (Stiglitz, 1975). Sometimes businesses fail at screening, 
and this creates the cost of firing that is associated with the price of uncertainty. 
When this cost grows, holding the return to hiring constant, it can be reasonably 
assumed that businesses become more selective in the screening process to 
minimize the cost. Businesses assess signals of potential employees to reduce the 
uncertainty of their hiring investment (Spence, 1973). Thus, when the employer 
becomes more selective, job applicants with relatively worse signals than other 
job applicants have a lower probability of getting the job since they bear higher 
uncertainty in regards to their productivity. Therefore, job seekers compete with 
each other to obtain better signals than others.  
 An asymmetrical information problem always exists in the market 
between buyers and sellers, and sellers give out signals in order to alleviate the 
problem by giving some information to buyers (Akerlof 1970). In the labor 
market, job seekers give out their signals for their labor to get purchased from 
employers, and employers evaluate those signals in order to reduce the risk of 
investment and to offer an adequate wage schedule. Cohen and Pfeffer (1986), in 
a study of organizational hiring standards, found a very strong positive correlation 
between employers’ selectivity and laborers’ education level. This indicates that 
education level is a signal that plays a large part in the employers’ selection 
decisions. There is a higher opportunity cost associated with hiring highly 
educated workers, which makes employers more cautious in making a hiring 
decision.  
 Investments in human capital, such as education, allow individuals to have 
more job opportunities in the market than the workers who do not invest in human 
capital. The rising marketability that results from human capital investment 
increases the price of the person’s labor due to the competition among businesses 
trying to capture highly productive workers (Becker, 1962; Schultz, 1961). 
Individuals are able to obtain good signals through investments that can be earned 
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 at a certain cost. Spence (1973) defines the incurred expense to earn such a signal 
as the signal cost, and states that individuals try to maximize the difference 
between signal costs and future offered wages. Then, it is not too difficult to see 
that the difference between the two increases after education. In other words, 
businesses pay more to obtain highly educated workers.  
 Businesses do not pay more to highly educated workers solely because 
they have a degree, but because their marginal revenue of labor is greater than that 
of the workers who do not hold college degree. Wage inequality and the education 
premium on wages, which is the wage gap between laborers with a college degree 
and without, have risen over time. This increase is explained by the growing 
demand for highly skilled labor (Juhn et al. 1993). Higher education is a signal of 
being a highly skilled laborer, and it has been compensated well in the market. 
However, not everyone who desires higher education can receive it. According to 
Chevalier et al. (2004), some people simply lack the ability to succeed in college. 
The research indicates that education does indeed play a large part in wage 
inequality.  However, what education is really doing in wage inequality is 
reflecting worker’s pre-existing ability relative to their potential enhanced 
productivity. Thus, having a college diploma is interpreted in the market as 
holding better capability compared to those who do not have a college diploma. 
This gives an incentive to people to obtain an education in order to earn such 
signals. 
 Furthermore, Arrow (1973) says employers cannot measure job seekers’ 
ability directly. Thus, they use filters to measure ability, and these filters are on-
the-job and college-filtering. These two filters are substitutable, and Arrow states 
that if the employers can filter the employees accurately through on-the-job 
filtering, the value of college-filtering decreases. However, the increasing supply 
of college graduates in the job market decreases the relative quality of non-
collegiate job seekers. This, in turn, raises the opportunity cost of on-the-job 
filtering. The rising cost of on-the-job filtering makes employers use college-
filtering instead. Thus, it can be assumed that low labor market flexibility raises 
the firing cost and makes employers look at job seekers’ educational attainment as 
a signal. Therefore, employers’ willingness to use educational attainment as a 
filtering process for job applicants can increase individuals’ demand for higher 
education. However, there are many other factors besides employers preferring 
college-filtering that could influence individuals’ demand for diplomas. One 
possible factor is technological advancements. 
 As discussed above, screening is a very beneficial tool for job seekers and 
employers since it increases the likelihood of job matching. However, severe 
screening that is caused by forces outside of the market, such as government 
intervention, can artificially increase the demand for diplomas and the output of 
college graduates. This leads to employers becoming more selective in order to 
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 minimize uncertainty, which in turn increases job seekers’ demand for obtaining 
more competitive signals. However, there are many other factors besides lowering 
labor market flexibility that might increase individuals’ demand for higher 
education. Government subsidies on education and increased demand for highly 
educated workers due to technological advances are two possible factors.  
 An individual’s decision to invest in human capital wholly depends on the 
differences between signal costs and the return to signaling, and this is called an 
internal rate of return on investment. When this rate is less than zero, rational 
individuals do not invest in human capital (Mincer, 1984). Government subsidies 
on education reduce the private cost of one’s education while it raises the public’s 
burden (Winston &Yen, 1995). Moreover, as Friedman (1963) states, these 
education subsidies for the general public tend to encourage over-investment in 
human capital. This happens because it gives individuals incentives to get higher 
education if the private return exceeds private cost. This occurs even if the total 
costs exceed the total returns. This is because education subsidies enable 
individuals to transfer their cost to future earnings and taxpayers.  
 Furthermore, increasing the demand for highly educated workers in the 
labor market leads to the same outcome as government subsidies. The education 
premium has been growing constantly since 1980, and this is represented in the 
increasing wage gap between high skilled and low skilled labor (Goldin& Katz, 
2009). Juhn et al (1993) explains that this wage gap is caused by skill-biased 
technological change. Demand for highly skilled labor increases in skill-biased 
economies, which raises the price of labor by different businesses bidding up the 
wage to capture such labor. This is shown in increasing wage inequality among 
workers who have different educational attainment, which signals how highly the 
worker is skilled. Therefore, it is not difficult to see that the increasing return on 
education will raise individuals’ demand for higher education. However, I 
consider this as a healthy increase in the total number of college graduates, since 
this effect is driven by market processes linked to technology advances, while 
other factors, such as lowering of labor market flexibility and government 
subsidies for education, are created by forces outside of the market. Market forces 
are preferred over non-market forces. This is because market forces reflect 
voluntary preferences through the price of goods and services. This helps different 
parties in trade to do precise economic calculation with the given information in 
prices, and this brings mutual benefits to these parties, if they engaged in trade 
voluntarily. Furthermore, since the voluntary preference is reflected, the market 
becomes more flexible and adaptable to unexpected information that could 
happen.    
 Therefore, after reviewing the previous scholarly articles, I hypothesize 
that lowering the labor market flexibility causes artificially increased percent of 
college diplomas in the job market, and government subsidies on education play a 
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 role of supplementing the effect of low labor market flexibility on education by 
transferring the private cost to the taxpayers. However, since the increase in the 
number of college graduates can be a response to the increasing education 
premium, there is also a natural growth of diplomas. 
 
Methodology 
 The OECD member country is the unit of analysis as I examine 28 
countries for testing the impact of low labor market flexibility on the demand for 
higher education. The study uses standard OLS multiple regression analysis, 
which is expressed as: 
      	
     
Wherepredictedpercentage of college diplomas in country i, b is a partial slope 
measuring the impact that each term has on  , is a measure of labor freedom 
in country i, 
  is a ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled workers’ average 
earnings,  represents public spending on tertiary education as a percent of total 
GDP, and  is an error term accounting for omitted variable bias.   
 For the dependent variable, I use the percentage of the adult population 
that has attained tertiary education, is 25 to 64 years old, and resides within an 
OECD country. These data are reported through Education at a Glance (2013) 
which is published by the OECD and originally from 2010. OECD compiled the 
data from the National Labour Force Surveys of OECD, the Eurostat databases, 
and the UNESCO institute of Statistics database.  
 The primary independent variable is the labor freedom index of OECD 
countries from the 2013 index of economic freedom provided by the Heritage 
Foundation. This index is a composition of six different factors that are weighted 
equally. These factors are: the ratio of minimum wage to the average added value 
per worker, the hindrances of hiring additional workers, the rigidity of hours, the 
difficulty of firing redundant employees, the legally mandated notice period, and 
the mandatory severance pay. These are the factors that increase the cost of 
uncertainty of hiring by harming labor market flexibility, if these are artificially 
enforced on the labor market by public policies. Therefore, using this index as the 
primary independent variable in the empirical test of finding a relationship 
between the percentage of the adult population that has attained tertiary education 
and labor market flexibility will produce appropriate data regarding the 
correlation of these two factors. These factors are compiled from World Bank, 
Doing Business 2013; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce, 2009–
2012; U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Commercial Guide, 2009–2012; 
and the official government publications of each country.   
 Furthermore, in order to test the correlation between the dependent and 
independent variables as precisely as possible, I control for public spending on 
tertiary education (percent of total GDP, taken from the Education at a Glance, 
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 OECD 2013). I also control for the effect of the earnings premium from education 
by using the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled workers’ average earnings (the 
relative earnings of all adults with incomes from employment by educational 
attainment, taken from Education at a Glance, OECD 2013). These are used as 
control variables because as government spending on education increases, 
individuals’ private cost of attaining education decreases. Also, as the earning 
premium of higher education rises, individuals will be more likely to pursue 
higher education, because the relative return on education has increased.  
 The theoretical model can be expanded into an empirical model. Taking 
each of the variables from the theoretical model and adding them in as separate 
terms yields the following equation for percent of the adult population who, at 
least, had college education at 2011 for country i: 
       	     ℮ 
Where   is the percent of the adult population who has attained tertiary 
education for country i at 2011, FREE is the labor freedom index for 2013, 
is the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled workers’ average earnings for 
2011,  is the public spending on tertiary education as a percent of total 
GDP for 2010, and ℮ is an error term.  
 
 Table 1, listed below, includes the dependent variable and the independent 
variables with control variables used in the model, along with their means and 
standard deviations. 
 
 Table 1 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
Percent of the adult population 
who has attained tertiary 
education 
32.691 9.739 
Labor market freedom index 66.214 17.648 
Ratio of high-skilled to low-
skilled workers’ average 
earnings 
1.746 .462 
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 Public spending on tertiary 
education as a percent of total 
GDP 
1.378 .5026 
 
 
Findings 
 Table 2, listed below, details the results of the regression model. In this 
model, I report unstandardized and standardized coefficients, significance levels, 
and the r2 value. The unstandardized coefficient is the partial slope of the 
regression plane. It gives the amount of change in the dependent variable from a 
one-unit change in the independent variable, all else constant. The standardized 
coefficients use a conversion to standard units, z-scores, and thus reflect the 
number of standard deviations the dependent variable will change from a standard 
deviation change in the independent variable. The r2 value in the model is the 
percentage of variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the 
variance in the independent variable also found in the model. 
 Surprisingly, the model shows that an increase in labor freedom by one 
index point leads to an increase of .218 percentage points in the adult population 
who has attained tertiary education. This correlation is not consistent with the 
hypothesis. The hypothesis states that labor market flexibility and the percent of 
college or higher education diplomas will have a negative correlation. However, 
empirical testing shows evidence that the labor market flexibility is positively and 
significantly associated with the percent of college graduates. The model indicates 
that if the labor market becomes more flexible, the percentage of college 
graduates in adult population increases, with a 95% confidence level.  
  Furthermore, in the model, the relationship between relative earnings as a 
control variable and the percentage of college diplomas is not consistent with the 
prior literature. However, the effect of public expenditure for education on the 
dependent variable is consistent with the literature, even though it is not 
significant. In the model, as the relative earnings for highly educated workers 
increases, the percentage of college graduates in the adult population decreases, 
but this variable failed to hold at the 90% confidence level.  
 Another surprising finding from this study is that the model only accounts 
for 27% of the variation in the percentage of the adult population who attained a 
tertiary education across OECD countries. Variations in all three different 
independent variables are only able to explain 27% of the variations in the 
dependent variable. 73% of the variation in the percentage of the adult population 
who attained a tertiary education is left unexplained by the different explanatory 
factors.  
 Thus, it seems evident that individuals’ demand for higher education is a 
multifaceted issue with many other explanatory factors. Therefore, the model 
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 suffers from omitted variable bias. One type of omitted variable in my model is 
other variables that influence individuals’ demand for higher education. This 
omitted variable bias results in the model explaining only a small portion of the 
variation in the percentage of the adult population who attained a tertiary 
education across OECD countries.  
 
Table 2 
Variables Model 
Labor freedom .218** 
(.395) 
Ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled workers’ 
average earnings 
-6.698 
(-.318) 
Public spending on tertiary education as a 
percent of total GDP 
2.919 
(.151) 
R Square .270 
 
Significance Measures: 
 *p< .10 (90% confidence level) 
 **p< .05 (95% confidence level) 
 ***p< .01 (99% confidence level) 
 
Analysis 
 The model shows a positive relationship between the primary independent 
variable and the dependent variable. This indicates that a more flexible labor 
market gives an incentive to individuals to pursue more education. Prior literature 
suggests that businesses reinforce screening in the hiring process when the cost of 
uncertainty increases. The original hypothesis states that the cost of risk increases 
due to labor market inflexibility that creates firing restrictions, and since 
employers become more selective in their hiring, individuals have a greater 
incentive to pursue higher education in order to obtain a good signal to compete 
for jobs. However, the model provides evidence that labor market flexibility is 
actually positively associated with individuals’ demands for higher education. 
 Rational individuals make a decision whether to invest in human capital or 
not based on their assessment of the internal rate of return on their investment 
(Mincer, 1984). This interpretation approach to the results suggests the possibility 
of an internal rate of return on human capital education, such as higher education, 
under the flexible labor market is higher than under the restricted labor market. In 
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 other words, attaining a higher education diploma creates a greater benefit to the 
individuals in a more flexible labor market.  
 A flexible labor market, which has less employment protection, produces 
low long-term unemployment while it increases short-term unemployment 
(Nickell, 1997). This indicates that individuals have a higher possibility of getting 
hired for permanent jobs in a flexible market. However, because there is less 
employment protection, which leads to lower firing cost, employers are freer to 
fire employees when they realize their employees’ productivity is lower than they 
expected. This exposes individuals to a higher risk of getting fired, which, in turn, 
raises their demands for higher education as a form of individual protection or 
insurance against unemployment. This is because people that have a college 
degree can find employment more easily if they are fired, and they are also less 
likely to be fired in the first place. 
 In an inflexible labor market, individuals compete with each other to be 
hired. However, in a flexible labor market, people may compete to not to get 
fired. In these two different labor market situations, people’s focal points shift and 
their incentives change. Productivity is expected to be a main factor in the 
evaluation of employees’ job performance, and if one’s productivity is not worth 
more than his or her offered wage, the probability of the employee getting fired is 
higher than that of others whose productivity is worth more than their wage. Thus, 
individuals would be more concerned about increasing their productivity in a 
flexible labor market as a form of insurance. 
 The human capital theory suggests that education and job training raise 
employees’ productivity through knowledge or skills acquisition, which are 
directly related to job performance (Becker, 2009). This indicates that individuals 
can choose between pursuing higher education or pursuing early job training by 
getting a job sooner than those who are getting higher education. The problem of 
productivity can be alleviated through human capital investment. However, 
Ramirez’s (1993) study on job mismatch in the Spanish labor market suggests 
empirical evidence that education level and required job training have a negative 
relationship. This means that individuals have to decide between these two 
different options in response to a rising risk of getting fired due to their own low 
productivity.  
 In a flexible labor market, businesses have more freedom to fire their 
employees at their will and individuals are more likely to pursue a college 
education, according to the statistical findings. In light of these findings, we can 
reasonably assume that the total return on investments in higher education is 
greater than that of required job training. A higher education diploma is a 
combination of gaining a good signal and enhancing one’s productivity and of 
insuring against unemployment (Arrow, 1973). However, required job training 
does not have the aspect of gaining a good signal that affects employers’ hiring 
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 decisions, because on the job training cannot exist before the employee is hired. 
Therefore, this suggests that in a flexible labor market there is a greater likelihood 
of individuals pursuing higher education rather than job training. Individuals do 
this in order to reduce the risk of not getting hired or of being fired and laid off, 
under the assumption that these two options have the same amount of impact on 
productivity.   
 Furthermore, highly educated workers usually have more occupational 
mobility compared to uneducated workers. Additionally, they are more likely to 
move to a higher occupation level if they feel they are overeducated for the 
current job (Ramirez, 1993; Sicherman, 1991). In other words, individuals with 
higher education levels have fewer obstacles up the corporate ladder or in 
changing occupations. A laborer having more occupational mobility than others in 
the labor market means that their labor is of higher value to other employers. This 
in turn brings more opportunities to the laborer (Schultz, 1961). This increases 
individuals’ incentive to pursue higher education, because the gain from the 
investment in higher education is greater than the gain from more hours of 
required job training.  
 Based on these interpretations, we can reasonably assume that individuals 
will be more likely to choose higher education over more hours of required job 
training in response to the rising risk of getting fired. This is equivalent to taking 
out an insurance policy against unemployment. Moreover, individuals’ 
preferences on investing in higher education become clearer in more flexible labor 
market situations. This is because a lower level of employment protection enables 
individuals to maximize the utility of their higher education diploma. It eliminates 
the restrictions that hinder businesses’ profit-maximizing efforts, which induces 
more competition among businesses to capture more productive employees. In 
other words, the value of an individuals’ internal rate of return on a higher 
education investment is greater in flexible labor markets than in an inflexible 
labor market. Thus, this line of reasoning explains the regression model that 
shows the positive relationship between labor market flexibility and percent of 
college degree attainments. However, the model does not test the causation of 
increasing the percent of people attaining college diplomas. Therefore, it could 
simply be the opposite causation with highly educated voters supporting 
governments that do not intervene in the labor market.  
 Moreover, the model shows that the relative earnings by educational 
attainment is negatively associated with the percent of higher education diplomas. 
This finding is not consistent with the prior literature, even though the variable is 
statistically insignificant. This result may be explained by the fact that the model 
is constructed with data that is taken from the same time period. In other words, if 
one country has high relative earnings on higher education, it means highly skilled 
workers are relatively scarce at the time. Conversely, if another country has low 
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 relative earnings in higher education, it may mean highly skilled workers are 
relatively abundant. Thus, the negative correlation between relative earnings and 
the percent of higher education diplomas may simply be the result of a low supply 
of highly-educated labor relative to demand causing high wages for highly-
educated labor. Since the high earnings premium from education could have been 
paired with low percentage of well-educated adult population in the economy, the 
statistical model could have produced the correlation result that is contrary to the 
literature. Thus, testing the relationship of the variables in a cause and effect 
framework with only a single time period may cause the unexpected finding.  
 
Public Policy Implications 
 Government intervention in the labor market creates unintended 
consequences (Merton, 1936). The original hypothesis of this research assumed 
that one of the unintended consequences of low labor market flexibility, caused by 
the government implementing policies in the intention of raising employment 
protection, is artificially increasing the percentage of college degrees attained in 
the labor market. However, the regression model shows the exact opposite 
relationship in comparison to what I expected between the dependent and 
independent variables. This indicates that the unintentional consequences of such 
public policies are that an inflexible labor market artificially decreases the 
percentage of higher education diplomas produced, rather than increasing it. Thus, 
there is the possibility that a labor force will tend to be under-educated if labor 
market flexibility remains low. 
 The government policies that harm the flexibility of the labor market claim 
to protect all employees. However, paradoxically, the only beneficiaries from 
such policies are employees who cannot continue being employed by their own 
efforts because of their lack of ability to produce. While the government protects 
their job, individuals’ incentive to pursue higher education drops due to the 
diploma losing its full potential, as it would have in an inflexible labor market. 
This causes an overall under-educated labor force relative to flexible labor 
markets in other OECD economies; moreover, Carnevale and Rose (2010) 
mention that an under-educated labor force will slow down the economic growth 
of a country. When the benefits of the policies are concentrated on a relatively 
small group of people who are not able to protect their job by themselves, the cost 
is diffused to the public who lose the full potential benefit that comes from the 
faster rate of economic growth (Olson, 2009).  
 Therefore, governments should aim to enhance labor market flexibility 
rather than harm it, in order to create wealth through their full potential by the 
economic growth, which leads to the rise of the individual quality of life. Also, 
Lucas (1988) states that endogenous forces of the market, which are investments 
in human capital and knowledge, bring economic growth. Therefore, providing a 
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 right institutional strategy that can increase individuals’ incentive to invest in such 
things is extremely important to be able to approach the full potential of the 
economy. In terms of labor market flexibility, this can be done by removing 
government policies that strengthen job security and bestowing freedom to 
businesses which enables them to hire or fire their employees on the basis of 
one’s productivity. Such freedom to employers increases employees’ risk of 
getting fired, and this increases employees’ incentive to invest in human capital in 
order to survive in competitive labor market by raising their own productivity. 
Therefore, under flexible labor market conditions, the economy may become 
closer to its full potential of creating wealth by businesses becoming more 
effective in generating profits while, individuals maximize the utility of their 
educational attainments.  
  
Conclusions 
 Using standard OLS multiple regression analysis, this study finds that 
labor market flexibility is positively associated with the percentage of the adult 
population who attained a tertiary education, which is the exact opposite of what 
the original hypothesis predicts. The model shows a positive relationship between 
these dependent and independent variables at the 95% confidence level, with r2 
value of 0.270. 
 This study, however, has many weaknesses. The limitation of cross-
sectional data is that it only allows the study to seek correlations, rather than 
causations. Also, the limited number of cases made it extremely difficult to draw 
statistical significance from control variables in the regression model. Moreover, 
the study suffered from omitted variable bias since the model is only able to 
explain 27% of the variation in the dependent variable. Given that the OECD 
countries are the unit of analysis, the model was unable to test the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables across more countries. This 
excludes the cases of less developed nations. Despite these weaknesses, the 
correlation between the dependent and independent variables is shown by the 
regression to have statistical significance, and the result can be explained by prior 
literature. Thus, it can serve as a preliminary guide to policy making.      
 The purpose of this study is to further the understanding of the impact of 
lower labor market flexibility on individuals’ demand for higher education. The 
research shows evidence of a positive correlation between labor market flexibility 
and the percent of college degrees attained in the labor market. However, because 
the model accounts for only 27% of the variations in the percent of higher 
education diplomas, future studies can examine the omitted variables as control 
variables in order to test the correlation between the dependent and independent 
variable in a more precise manner. Moreover, as discussed above, the impact of 
labor market flexibility on the percent of higher education diplomas can be 
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 changed by the role of higher education, which is determined by a different 
combination of signaling and productivity. Thus, future studies can also examine 
higher education’s generalized combination of signaling and productivity to test 
how individuals’ demand for higher education changes in reaction to this different 
combination. But, more importantly, future research should aim to study the 
causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables to gain a 
deeper understanding that can help influence public policy.  
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